Real interest rates rose to historically high levels in 1980 and remained high throughout the decade. Macroeconornists attribute this phenomenon to a combination of tight monetary policy, fiscal deficits, and variable inflation rates. This paper presents preliminary evidence for an additional explanation of high real rates that is related to the decade-long crisis in the savings and loan industry. Deposit insurance, moral hazard, and regulatory forbearance provide the incentives and the means for insolvent thrifts to issue liabilities that compete with Treasury securities in the market for funds. Thus, as the magnitude of the thrift crisis grew during the 1990s, so did pressure on Treasury yields. Even if the effect of the S&L crisis on interest rates is small, the increased cost of financing the public debt adds significantly to the total costs associated with the savings and loan fiasco.
I. Introduction
Real interest rates were extraordinarily high in the l9SOs by historical standards. From 1926 to 1981, the average real rate of interest on short-term Treasury bills was 0.1%, whereas the real rate averaged 4.7% for the final nine years of the decade'. The break in the time series appears equally sharp if one examines the monthly data from 1975 to 1989. Figure 1 shows the real rateof return on six-month Treasury bills over that period.2 In the late l970s, the peaks in the rates of return were under 1 percent, whereas in the l9SOs the troughs were at a comparable level. Very few time series illustrate such a sharp shift upwards. We have done some simple statistical tests on this time series; the results confirm what is apparent in the figure.
Real interest rates shifted upwards by four or five percentage points in approximately 1980. The question is why. In this paper we review two of the 'Ibbotson (1989) .
2 These are ex post real rates, calculated by converting both CD and Treasury rates to an annual yield basis and then subtracting the realized rate of inflation over the term of the investment. The dramatic jump displayed in Figure 1 also holds for ex ante rates calculated using lagged inflation rates or survey data. While each of these theories is a plausible cause of an increase in real rates, we question whether individually or collectively they can fully explain the magnitude and persistence of the shift shown in Figure 1 .
(where r is a real treasury bill or certificate of deposit rate in period t, c is a constant term, 680 is a dummy which is 1 in the l980s and 0 before, , is an error term, and a measures the difference between real rates in the 1980s and a previous period), the point estimate of a is four to five hundred basis points and always significant at the 95 percent level. The difference in rates is significant whether one divides the sample at 1980, 1981, or 1982, although There is a moral hazard problem in a troubled thrift.5 The down but not out thrift institutions have every reason to take extra risks. The bigger the risk and the higher the stakes, the greater the chance that the firm might be saved. Of course, there also is a great chance that things will just go from bad to worse, but neither the owners (who may have had none of their money at stake at this point) nor the depositors (who are insured) have 5See Kane (1989 Kane ( , 1990 . The moral hazard problem is essentially the same as that found in a corporation with outstanding bonds, though it is exacerbated by the fact that S&Ls typically are leveraged to a much greater degree than most corporations.
substitutes for deposits in safer institutions. Naturally, the safer institutions have to follow the movement up in yields if they want to remain competitive in the market for funds. The yield on other safe, short-term assets, such as Treasury bills, must also increase to remain as attractive as certificates of deposit.
We are not the first to point out a link between the savings and loan crisis and high interest rates. However, we think our mechanism is different and should be added to the list of connections. A number of authors have written that high nominal interest rates jeopardized the health of S&Ls engaged in the business of maturity intermediation.
The fact that the high nominal rates of 1979 and 1980 devastated the market value net worth of the industry was first documented by Carron (l982) .
Others have noted that the recent borrowing of the Resolution Trust Corporation to finance the cleanup of the industry will make normal Treasury borrowing more costly.8 Neither of these connections is related to our claim that the yield on truly safe assets such as 6The equity holders essentially have a call option on the firm with an exercise price equal to the firm's outstanding debt. The value of this call option increases with the riskiness of the firm's assets. 7See also Kane (1985) and Brumbaugh (1988) . 8That is, Treasury borrowing costs will rise if the supply or loanable funds curve is upward sloping.
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Treasury bills has increased to allow them to remain competitive with risky assets which look safe to depositors due to underpriced deposit insurance.
The impact of the high real interest rates of the 1980s on the economy was certainly severe. Presumably investment was crowded out, economic growth was slower, merger activity and corporate restructuring were affected, and the levels of foreign holdings of U.S. assets were increased.9 The deficit problem was made far more severe, possibly adding as much as $100 billion per year to federal government interest costs by the end of the decade.
If the government's handling of the S&L crisis explains even a small part of high real interest rates, then the cost of the S&L bailout may be significantly increased.
The next section briefly discusses the existing theories of why real interest rates were so high in the l980s. Then, section 3 discusses the extent to which Treasury bills and securities offered by S&Ls are close substitutes. We argue in section 4 that even if we observe only modest deposit flows into S&Ls, rates offered on CD5 may have significant effects on Treasury rates.
Section 5 presents evidence that troubled thrifts raised their rates in an apparently successful attempt to attract additional funds. Section 6 presents some very rough estimates of the cost of the "moral hazard premium" to the Treasury due to the higher rates 9For a discussion of these effects see the volume edited by Rivlin (1984) , or the article by Blair and Litari (1990). forced upon it by the competitor created by deposit insurance.
Finally, section 7 contains some concluding remarks.
II. The Traditional Explanations
Elementary macroeconomics teaches that large federal budget deficits cause high real interest rates. The argument underlying this view is straightforward: the increase in government borrowing to finance budget deficits is not fully offset by increased private saving, so the interest rate must rise. As intuitively appealing as it might be, this proposition may be questioned on both That is, consumers know that the present value of current and future deficits must be zero, so a higher current deficit implies '°Econcmic Report of the President, 1990 . The latter figure covers the years 1982-89.
In 1982 dollars, the average annual Consistent with this hypothesis, Plosser (1982 Plosser ( , 1987 and Evans (1987a) Blanchard and Summers (1984) and Iluizinga and Mishkin (1986) argue that the primary force behind the increase in real rates was the change in Federal Reserve policy in October 1979. They present evidence that the change to "tight" money regime shifted the stochastic process governing real rates. To buttress this argument, Mishkin (1988) points to a similar episode in the 1920s '1Evans (l987b) finds no evidence of a link between deficits and interest rates for Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the U.K., or the U.S.
121n his exhaustive review of the literature, Bernheixn (1987) criticizes the theoretical foundations and empirical evidence for the proposition that deficits do not affect interest rates or other real variables. See also Bernheim and Bagwell (1988) , Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985) , and Poterba and Summers (1987). 7 in which an unusually large increase in real rates followed a move to tighter money. However, monetary policy was not as "tight" throughout the decade as it was in the late 70s and early 805, but real interest rates remained at very high levels.
Expectations provide the basis for another explanation for high real rates in the 1980s. According to this theory, lenders who had earned very low or negative real rates of return on their investments in the inflationary 70s were slow to adjust their expectations of inflation. Because of the relatively rapid pace of disinflation in the early 1980s, the high real rates of return earned by investors in Treasury securities in the 1980s were just as much a "surprise" as the negative returns during the previous decade.
While it is plausible that investors did not anticipate the rapid pace of disinflation during 1980-81, the rate of inflation was relatively stable throughout the mid and late 80s'.
Real interest rates on Treasury bills, however, remained significantly higher than in previous decades. Explaining this as the result of a consistent inflation "surprise" strains credulity when the actual rate of inflation is steady. For example, in Figure 2 we plot the expected real rate of interest on Treasury bills using inflation forecasts obtained from Eggert's Blue Chip
Consensus.14 While the real rates reported in this graph are '3The December-to-December changes in the Consumer Price Index were 3.9%, 3.8%, 4.0%, and 3. 8% in 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1985 respectively.
'4Eggert surveys approximately 40 forecasting services each month and reports their current predictions for GNP, inflation, unemployment, etc. The consensus forecast is simply the average of We do not wish to dismiss any of the above explanations. All have some merit.'5 At the same time, we believe that none of these theories alone can completely explain the pattern of interest rates described above.
Below we present evidence consistent with our theory that the savings and loan crisis contributed to high real interest rates in the past decade.
III. The Substitutability of CDs and Treasury Bills
The argument that Treasury security yields have carried a moral hazard premium in the l980s does not require that Treasury bills and CDs be perfect substitutes. However, it does require that they be close substitutes in the sense that the demand for one of them decreases significantly when the terms offered on the other improve. The purpose of this section is to clarify the degree to which Treasury bills and CD5 are substitutes, and the degree to which federally insured CDs offered by weak institutions are substitutes for CDs of sound thrift institutions.
all the forecasts.
"One could construct an argument that the monetary policy shift in 1979 initially caused real rates to increase and that deficits kept rates high throughout the decade.
Given the empirical evidence against the proposition that deficits have affected interest rates (in any historical period), we believe that the persistence of high real rates requires further explanation.
Treasury bills are generally considered to be risk-free securities. While unpredictable inflation causes the real return to be somewhat uncertain and interest rate variability may cause uncertainty regarding the return when the bill is not held until maturity, the full 3 month or 6 month nominal return is safe and predictable. Are insured CDs equally safe?
Insured CDs have turned out to be extraordinarily safe ex-post.
All such deposits have been honored at all of the troubled thrifts in the past decade.
Even deposits over the $100,000 insurance The costs of obtaining CDs and Treasury bills also differ. As long as tf is greater than zero, the loss of the state tax deduction increases the spread. Note that in both equations the spread equals zero in the absence of a state income tax.
'SIt is interesting to note that the average nominal yield from 1975-1989 on CD5 was 9.6%, while the average spread was approximately 56 basis points. Given these values, the marginal tax rate "implied" by the formula above is 5.83%.
In 1984, marginal state tax rates ranged from 0% to 14.1% for an investor with a $40,000 income. Across states, the average marginal rate was 5.3% and the median marginal rate was 5.4%.
20The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, and Money Magazine regularly publish this information, and investors can also obtain a list of high-paying thrifts by calling a 1-900 service. respectively. In other words, the series move together. 
V. Are Marginal Thrifts Attracting Funds with High CD Yields?
Marginal thrifts might offer high rates on CD5 for two reasons. First, they might offer high rates to offset the apparent riskiness of their securities. In this case, high rates would simply allow marginal deposit institutions to "hold their own' against institutions offering more solid securities.
Second, marginal deposit institutions might offer high rates on CDs to attract above-normal deposit flows. In the first case, the high rates available at some institutions would not spread to government securities, or even necessarily to other deposit institutions.
Rather, the high rates would simply compensate depositors in highrisk thrifts for bearing additional risk.25
In order for high rates to be contagious, marginal deposit institutions need to offer rates high enough not only to compensate investors for any additional risk, but also to entice them out of their current investments, at least if those current investments did not change their terms. Indeed, this is the central mechanism of our story: deposit institutions offer rates high enough to reduce the supply of money for government securities, thus raising the cost of borrowing.
One can present evidence, some anecdotal and some more systematic, that "bad" deposit institutions raise the cost of funds at "good" S&Ls.26
On the anecdotal front, the New York Times quoting new rates several times in only a few days. Both of these institutions were slated for a federal takeover, but regulators had not stepped in to stop the rate war. Executives at other S&Ls in 25For example, Lawrence White argues that the so-called "Texas premium" paid by thrifts in that state did not come about because those institutions were aggressively seeking new funds. Texas S&Ls paid higher rates to compensate depositors for increased risk. At the same time, however, White recognizes that even healthy Texas thrifts were forced to pay a (smaller) premium. If solvent thrifts raise their rates to compete with insolvent ones, then it is plausible that this "contagion" effect could spread to thrifts in other regions and to other types of assets. 26Stiglitz has suggested that this is a kind of Gresham's Law for S&Ls.
the Houston market complained that they were forced to keep pace with their financially-troubled rivals to maintain their deposit base.
Thus, the managers of healthy S&Ls regarded their rival's CDs as close substitutes for their own, despite their healthier financial position.
The funds that an S&L attracts when it raises its CD rates need not come only from its local market. The specific rates we are using are quotes on six-month CDs. We count only those institutions that appear during the latter half of a given year since we are comparing the rates on six-month CDs offered by these S&Ls to end-of-year deposit flows. Finally, since we do not report results for all states, the row sums do not always equal thirty.
31Note that the states with high-rate thrifts tend to be the states known to have significant S&L failures: Texas, California, and in the latter years, Massachusettes. Though we do not have data on institutions offering the highest rates prior to 1986, Texas S&Ls experienced dramatic inflows throughout the early and mid 1980s, not a surprising finding given the well-publicized "Texas premium" that these institutions were offering at the time.
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thrifts nationwide.
The same was true for thrifts in Massachusettes and New York.32 32The link between high rates and deposit flows is not perfect. Despite offering high rates, Texas thrifts began to lose funds in 1988. However, in 1988 regulators adopted and aggressively pursued their Southwest Plan, designed to drastically reduce the number of institutions operating in Texas. This accounts for a large part of the decline in Texas deposits. Note that the outflow of deposits in Texas accelerated once those institutions no longer offered the highest rates in the country. 331n 1989 the S&L industry experienced net deposit outflows. This changes the sign of the relative growth rate measure. For example, if a state has a net deposit inflow its relative growth rate (using the formula described above) would be a negative number since deposit growth for the industry was negative. To simplify interpretation of the table, we reverse the sign of the numbers reported for 1989 only.
Thus, Nassachusettes S&LS experienced deposit inflows during the year while deposits in Texas thrifts actually decreased. If the argument outlined above is correct (that high CD rates have driven up federal borrowing costs), then it is interesting to ask what is the additional cost to the U.S. Treasury. Suppose that deposit institutions are able to raise the rate on Treasury securities by some amount () for ten years. Over the ten-year period, old, low-rate debt is gradually replaced with new high-rate debt (where the high rate is higher than the low rate).
For example, in the first year of the high-rate period, all existing government debt with maturity of less than a year is replaced with high-rate debt; a portion of the longer-maturity lowrate debt is replaced with high-rate debt. After ten years, all of the old (low-rate) debt with maturity less than ten years has been replaced with high-rate debt. After ten years (when the rate has 34Ainple anecdotal evidence suggests that funds flow between Treasury bills and CDs. See, for example, the statements of Janies Barth, then chief economist of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, in 1989 FHLBB News Bulletins.
He is quoted repeatedly explaining flows from CDs in terms of current movements in the spread between CD and Treasury bills. fallen to its original low level), the fraction of outstanding debt at the high rate declines. The assumed maturity distribution was obtained by averaging the actual distribution reported in the Treasury Bulletin from 1985-90. The actual maturity classes are intervals (i.e., 5-10 years, rather than just 5 years), but we make the conservative assumption that all securities in a given maturity class have the maximum maturity for that class. This is conservative in the sense that the fraction of the total debt that must be financed during the 10-year period of high rates is reduced.
Given the fraction of the debt in each maturity category,we calculate a, the fraction of debt paying the high rate, for years 1 through 40 (the first year of high rates until 30 years after the rates go down, when the last high-rate 30-year bill is retired).
For example, at the end of the first year of the high rate period, 26 all debt with maturity of one year or less is at the high rate, while one fifth of the five-year debt pays the high rate, one tenth of the ten-year debt pays the high rate, one twentieth of the twenty-year debt pays the high rate, and one thirtieth of the thirty-year debt pays the high rate.
We calculate the additional cost to the government as follows:
EDeaJ(l + r)t, where t runs from 1 to 40, and D = the average real national debt, 1980-1989, r the discount rate, and = the effect of CDs on Treasury bill rates.
This method gives us an order-of-magnitude estimate of the cost to the Treasury of the moral hazard premium in interest rates. 
